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CASENOTES 515 
BASTARDS-REQUIREMENTS FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
IN NEBRASKA 
A truck driver, in the presence of a competent witness, signed 
an application for employment in Nebraska in which he stated 
that he had two sons dependent upon him for support, and named 
the sons. The driver was later killed in an auto accident, and 
in a wrongful death action the question arose as to whether the 
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application was a sufficient acknowledgment under the Nebraska 
statutes1 to legitimate the sons who were concededly born out of 
wedlock. Held :2 reversing on rehearing a prior opinion3 on the 
same facts, that the writing was sufficient to meet the tests of 
the statute. The result is at last a definitive statement of the 
Nebraska court's attitude concerning the problem of legitimation, 
and is in accord with the prevailing liberal view of treatment of 
children born out of wedlock. 
Section 30-109 has been construed to require proof of three 
facts: (1) that the child was born out of wedlock; (2) that the 
alleged father was in fact the real father; and (3) that the 
father has acknowledged the child in the terms of the statute.4 
In the instant case, it was conceded that facts (1) and (2) had 
been proved, 13 but it was asserted that the application did not con-
stitute sufficient acknowledgment. 
In two early Nebraska cases it was decided that the statu-
tory provision established two requirements for the acknowledg-
ment: (1) it must be one in which the paternity is directly, un-
equivocally, and unquestionably acknowledged; and (2) the writ-
ing must be in and of itself sufficient, unaided by extrinsic evi-
dence, to establish the paternity.6 In light of this statement, it 
would seem that the writing must show on its face that the child 
was born out of wedlock; that the alleged father actually was 
the real father, and that the father acknowledged the child. In 
the first hearing on the instant case, the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska held that the application form was not an express, un-
equivocal and unquestionable acknowledgment of the paternity of 
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-109 (Reissue 1948), insofar as it is pertinent, 
provides: "Every child born out of wedlock shall be considered as an 
heir of the person who shall, in writing, signed in the presence of a com-
petent witness. have acknowledged himself to be the father of the 
child .... " This statute has remained virtually the same since Nebraska 
became a state in 1867, the only change being that before 1943 the firs~ 
phrase read "Every illegitimate child," instead of "Every child born out 
of wedlock." See Neb. Comp. Stat. § 30-109 (1929); Neb. Comp. Stat. 
§ 1228 (1922); Neb. Comp. Stat. §1273 (1913); Neb. Rev. Stat. c. 14, § 
31, p. 62 (1867). 
2 Peetz v. Jllasek Auto Supply Co., 161 Neb. 588, 74 N.W.2d 474 (1956). 
3 Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co., 160 Neb. 410, 70 N.W.2d 482 (1955) . 
.i In Re Estate of Oakley, 149 Neb. 556, 31 N.W.2d 557 (1948). 
Ii Brief of Appellant. p. 27, Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co., 161 Neb. 
588, 74 N.W.2d 474 (1956). 
o Moore v. Flack, 77 Neb. 52, 108 N.W. 143 (1906); Lind v. Burke, 56 
Neb. 785, 77 N.W. 444 (1898). 
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the children.7 On rehearing, however, the court held that the ap-
plication was one in which the paternity was directly, unequivoc-
ally and unquestionably acknowledged. The court also overruled 
the requirement that the writing must be in and of itself suffici-
ent, without extrinsic evidence, to establish paternity. 
Whether one believes the court's latest interpretation of sec-
tion 30-109, setting a liberal standard for acknowledgment, was 
progressive depends in large part upon one's values; but it is sub-
mitted, as will be explained later, that the court was correct in 
holding that this application for employment was a sufficient ac-
knowledgment. The decision is equally as noteworthy in that the 
7 The construction of the Nebraska statute could have been avoided in 
the instant case. The truck driver, his wife and the illegitimate children 
were all domiciled in Iowa at the time of the accident and had been for 
some time prior to the driver's death. There is a wide split of authority 
as to which law governs the attainment of the status of legitimacy. See, 
e.g., Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 137 (2d ed. 1938); 2 Beale, Conflict of 
Laws §§ 139.1-140.1 (1935); 1 Wharton. Conflict of Laws §§ 240-248 
(1905); Story, Conflict of Laws § 93 (1834); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 626 
(1946); Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945); Wolf v. 
Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346 (1916); Hall v. Gabbert, 213 Ill. 
208, 72 N.E. 806 (1904); Franklin v. Lee, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N.E. 78 
(1901). The better rule would appear to apply Iowa law to determine 
whether the children were legitimate. Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 
137-140 (1934); McNamara v. McNamara, 303 Ill. 191, 135 N.E. 410 
(1922), cert. denied, 260 U.S. 734 (1922). Under the Nebraska Uni-
form Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-12,101 to 
25-12,107 (Reissue 1948), the Nebraska courts will take judicial notice 
of the laws of all other jurisdictions in the United States, but the court 
has the right to require that such law be pleaded, even though it need not 
be proved. The Nebraska Supreme Court does require foreign law to be 
pleaded. Smith v. Brooks, 154 Neb. 93, 47 N.W.2d 389 (1951); Scott v. 
Scott, 153 Neb. 906, 46 N.W.2d 627 (1951). In the instant case, it ap-
pears that counsel for the illegitimates did not plead the Iowa law but 
sought to amend the pleadings at the trial to do so. The trial court agreed 
on the condition that counsel submit to a continuance to allow the de-
fendant to prepare on the matter. This offer was rejected by the plain-
tiff's counsel, and the court would not allow Iowa law to be pleaded. See 
Brief for Appellee in Support of Motion for Rehearing, p, 7, and Supple-
mental Brief for Appellant, p. 10, Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co., 161 
Neb. 588, 74 N.W.2d 474 (1956). The Iowa legitimation statute, so far 
as pertinent, provides: "They [illegitimates] shall inherit from the father 
when . . . they have been recognized by him as his children; but such 
recognition must have been general and notorious, or else in writing." 
Iowa Code § 646.46 (1950). The application for employment in the in-
stant case, coupled with other evidence of recognition brought out at the 
trial. would seem clearly to have legitimated the children under Iowa law. 
See Re Estate of Wulf, 242 Iowa 1012, 48 N.W.2d 890 (1951); Trier v. 
Singmaster, 184 Iowa 307, 167 N.W. 538 (1918); Luce v. Tompkins, 177 
Iowa 168, 158 N.W. 535 (1916). 
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rejection of the "no extrinsic evidence" test should serve to eli-
minate a great deal of confusion in Nebraska law governing legi-
timation. 
The "no extrinsic evidence" rule was first advanced in Lind 
v. Bu1•ke,8 but since no writing was introduced to prove acknow-
ledgment in that case, the statement was dictum.9 Nonetheless, 
in Moore v. Flack,1° another case in which no writing was intro-
duced to prove acknowledgment, the rule was reiterated. The test 
was not explained in either case. Thomas v. Estate of Thomas,11 
decided in the interim period between the Lind and Moore cases, 
appears to have destroyed any reasoning which might have sup-
ported the rule, and this fact was recognized by the court at the 
rehearing in the instant case. The Thomas case, depending heavily 
on Blythe v. Ayres,12 a California case construing a statute quite 
similar to Nebraska's,13 held that no intent to make the child an 
heir was required by the statute. It further held that the writing 
need not mention the illegitimacy of the child or that it had been 
witnessed, and the witness did not have to attest the writing. As 
S 56 Neb. 785, 77 N.W. 444 (1898). 
9 In the Lind case, the evidence adduced was the statement of a rail-
road agent that he wrote a letter for Lind, in English. which would assist 
Lind's alleged child in getting from New York to Central City. The writ-
ing was not introduced at the trial, and only the statement of the agent 
showed the paternity. The court stated in the syllabus that the evidence 
was insufficient to permit a claim of heirship. 
10 77 Neb. 582, 108 N.W. 143 (1906). No writing was introduced in 
ihe Moore case, but the deposition of a county judge who had presided at 
a paternity action in which Moore was found to be the father of the 
plaintiff stated that the judge thought that Moore had acknowledged the 
plaintiff during the course of that action. .Another party testified by 
deposition that he had delivered a note from Moore to the mother of the 
child, and the note had said, "Take good care of our boy and call him 
Thomas Moore, and I will give him a good start some day." The court 
held that such testimony was not conclusive in the absence of any writing 
in court. 
11 64 Neb. 581, 90 N.W. 630 ,1902). No writing was produced in the 
Thomu.s case, but a witness testified that the father and mother had drawn 
an agreement stating "That John D. Thomas, the party of the first part, 
hereby acknowledges himself to be the father of Frank P. Thomas, the 
child born to Martha Haight," and that the witness had seen Thomas sign 
the writing. The trial court had held that this was not a sufficient ac-
knowledgment, but the supreme court reversed, holding that it was a 
question of fact for the jury. 
1:! 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915 (1892). In the Blythe case, letters written 
by Blythe to his child and to her grandfather, signed in the presence of 
a witness, actually were introduced in evidence. 
13 "Every illegitimate child is an heir of any person who. in writing, 
signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be 
the father of such child." Cal. CiY. Code § 1387 (1872). 
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a necessary concomitant of this holding, extrinsic evidence would 
have to be introduced to show illegitimacy, and to prove that the 
writing was witnessed. Thus the "no extrinsic evidence" rule 
seems to have been neatly emasculated, but the Moore case, al-
though accepting the statement in Thomas that no intent to make 
the child an heir was necessary, adhered to the rule. 
Van Hove v. Van Hove,14 the next case, in point of time, to 
construe the statute, stated that since it was not proved that the 
alleged father was the father of the illegitimate child, a writing 
which failed to state that the father was the actual father of the 
child and which was not shown to have been signed in the presence 
of a witness did not satisfy the terms of the statute. This case 
appears to have revived the "no extrinsic evidence" rule, but In 
Re Estate of Winslow,15 upon which the instant decision is based, 
held that once paternity is clearly established, a letter with only 
a modicum of evidence showing the paternal relationship was suf-
ficient acknowledgment. Until the decision in the instant case 
the law on this point has been most confused, as the apparent in-
consistencies in their various holdings had not been given any ex-
planation by the court. The instant case, by eliminating the rule, 
should also eliminate the confusion. 
From the dross of these conflicting decisions, the essence of 
the rule in the instant case can be refined ; that when illegitimacy 
and proof of paternity are established, almost any writing which 
indicates that the father recognizes the child as his, no matter 
what its form, content, or the intent behind it, will be held to be 
sufficient acknowledgment. Following the lead of the Blythe, 
Thomas, and Winslow cases, the court seems to have accepted the 
policy that the only strictness involved should be in proof of 
paternity, and once that is satisfactorily established, courts "should 
lean strongly in favor of a finding that the father of an illegi-
timate child has done what every honest and humane man should 
be not only willing, but eager to do, and what a just law would 
compel the unwilling to do."16 
14 94 Neb. 575, 143 N.W. 815 (1913), aff'd on rehearing, 96 Neb. 484, 
148 N.W. 152 (1915). The writing in the Van Hove case was a statement 
contained in a record of marriage contracted in Belgium, and stated "The 
above named husband and wife agreed taking as their lawful children, and 
to recognize them as such (naming plaintiff and other childen) .••. " 
This was introduced in evidence. 
15 115 Neb. 553, 213 N.W. 819 (1927). The writings were letters 
written by Winslow to his daughter, and were addressed in the saluation 
as "Dear Daughter," or "Dear Daughter and Children." and were signed 
"Your loving father." These were introduced in evidence. 
16 Blythe v . .Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 589, 31 Pac. 915, 926 (1892). 
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It is often stated that legitimation statutes should be strictly 
construed,17 in order that a stranger to an intestate's blood would 
be unable to gain any part of the intestate's property. But if 
strict proof of paternity is required, this concern is obviated, and 
under the rule set out in the instant case, the father is aided in 
carrying out what he recognizes as a moral duty to the child and 
to society. The present rule seems in accord both with prevailing 
judicial policy and other Nebraska policy in regard to illegitimate 
children. 
In most states one of two kinds of statutes is usually enacted 
to provide for legitimation.18 One type provides that the acknow-
ledgment must be in writing, and the other type requires only 
that the recognition be open and notorious. In those states which 
require recognition in writing, the statutes generally are liberally 
construed,19 and it is usually held that there need be no intent 
shown by the writing to make the child an heir. 
Both those states which require writing and those which do 
not would seem to require that there must be proof of paternity 
and proof of illegitimacy.20 The writing and the open and notori-
ous recognition are merely two different means to achieve the 
same end the requirement of a writing being the more rigid stand-
ard. Since the policy behind both types of statutes is the same, 
the mere fact of a writing should suffice, without the requirement 
of a formal document. 
Especially in wrongful death actions,21 such as was involved 
in the instant case, where no question of the inheritance of prop-
erty is involved, but rather where the negligent actor is sought to 
be held accountable for his wrong doing, the present rule is a wise 
one. Society benefits from having the negligent actor, rather 
than the public as a whole, bear the burden of supporting the 
children if they are dependent. 
17 Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F2d 464 (10th Cir. 1930); Estate of Paterson. 
34 Cal. App.2d 305, 93 P.2d 825 (1939); In re Riemann's Estate, 124 Kan. 
539, 262 Pac. 16 (1927). 
lSSee Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 705 (1954). 
w See Wall v. Altobello, 49 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1950); Barber v. Barber, 
198 Okla. 520, 180 P.2d 658 (1947); In re Winslow's Estate, 115 Neb. 553, 
213 N.W. 319 (1927); Erickson v. Erickson's Estate, 191 Iowa 1393, 180 
N.W. 664 (1920); In re Loyd's Estate, 170 Cal. 85, 148 Pac. 522 (1915); 
Thomas v. Thomas' Estate, 64 Neb. 581, 90 N.W. 630 (1902); Blythe v. 
Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915 (1892). 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934); 
Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343 (1943), cert. denied, 
320 u.s. 761 (1943). 
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Nebraska has shown itself to favor legitimacy in several in-
stances. In all marriages which terminate in annulment or di-
vorce, save only those where consanguinity or miscegenation are 
involved, the termination of the marital relationship has no effect 
upon the legitimacy of the children. 22 And children born of a mar-
riage relationship are to be treated as legitimate even though born 
so soon after marriage that it is a certainty that conception oc-
curred before marriage.23 Thus Nebraska, by both legislative and 
judicial decision, and again in the instant case, has demonstrated 
an awareness of the humane concept that the onus for the act of 
the parent cannot justly be placed upon the child, and that the 
policy of visiting the sins of fathers upon helpless children no 
longer expresses our prevailing views of justice. 
James W. Hewitt, '56 
22 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-325 through 42-328 (Reissue 1952). 
23 Hudson v. Hudson, 151 Neb. 210, 36 N;W.2d 851 (1949). 
